In this paper, the idea of an inference policy is explored in some detail.
To support this exploration, the characteristics of some standard and nonstandard inference po l ic ies are examined. 1982) .
SATISFYING REQUIREMENTS
Furthermo r e , expertl's judgment are generally more extreme than expert2 . However, it is uncertain as to the extent to which the two agents judgments are redundant or independent .
Since the system must support a human decision maker, it is c ons idered desirable that the inference system also be reliable.
Reliability makes it
easier for a user to determine circumst anc es when the aid's advice should be accepted, which often increases the accuracy of the user/machine combination [Lehner, et.al., 1989] . Assuming that ideally rational agents do not accept such gambles, we must conclude that the belief values of such agents conform to the probability calculus.
Another line is the scoring rule argument.
If an agent wishes to minimizes her error rate, and the scoring rule for measuring error is additive, then the expected error rate is minimal only if the agents belief values are derived from the probability calculus [Lindley, 1982] . On the other hand, for inference domains that require point valued estimates, and minimizing error rate seems the appropriate goal, it is hard to imagine how a non-Bayesian system could be appropriate.
2 Interval Probabilitv Models
The standard litany on expert system {ES) technology claims that ESs encode human expert knowledge. Consequently, a properly engineered ES should make the same inferences that a human expert would.
In the knowledge engineering literature, it is considered desirable to base a knowledge base on multiple experts. Consequently, an ES should encode the common knowledge of experts and generate belief values that conform with this common knowledge.
If experts disagree, then a point-value system cannot possibly reflect common expert knowledge.
On the other hand, it is arguable that interval probability systems do maintain common knowledge.
If [Lehner, 1989] .
We now turn this a roun d .
If a causal learning scheme responds to new instances by seeking deterministic rules for pred i cting that instance, then one would expect a postive correlation between the relat ive frequency of an event, and the proportion of possible states containing that event.
The more of ten X occurs, the greater the number of factors perceived as causally lead ing to X, resulting in a greater proportion of log ically possible states containing X.
For some domains, theref ore, ratios of possible states may provide a perfectly reasonable inference policy.
Even though the causal learn ing mechanism may not explicitly take into account probab i listic considerat ions (e.g ., as in most concept learning and explanation-based learning systems), there may be good reason to believe one can extract reasonable belief values from such systems.
Possibilitv and Probability
In section 1.0, we discussed an inference domain where reliable judgments were required.
Here we expand a little on this idea. Consider the following problem.
An inf erence system must be developed that must service the information requirements of multiple decision systems.
Each decision system will query the inference module as needed regarding the status (truth value or degree of support) of certain propositions. The spec i fic proposit ions queried will vary in each context.
Since the propos i tions to be queried cannot be pred i cted, it is decided that the inference system will maintain an up-to-date description of the current situation.
That is, for some set of atomic propositions and their log ically distinct combinations, the system should be able to report a belief value on request. Finally, it is considered important that the inference system be reliable.
That is, for each set Sx (all sentences believed to degree X), the expected proportion of truths in Sx is X. The reason for this is simply that from one problem to the next, the elements of Sx that are queried is unpredictable (more or less "random").
Consequently, if the system is reliable then the expected proportion of truths of propositions reported with degree of belief X is X.
What type of inf erence policy would guarantee satisfying these requirements?
As it turns out [Lehner, 1989) , Minimizing expected error requires conformance to the probability ca l culus, thereby giving up on reliabi lity.
On the other hand, re l iability is only guaranteed if the inference system reports judgments that do not conform to the probabi lity calculus.
To illustrate , suppose an inference system knew p(a)=.8 and p(b)=.6, but had no information on p(a&b).
As shown in Table 1 
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. Suppose however that the agent decides to set a more conservat iv e belief threshold, say X=.99. Now our ag ent concludes p with probability .99 whenever �P cannot be deduced with .99 certainty.
The more conservative the t hresho ld , the less evidence needed for the agent to jump to a stronger conclusion. Howev e r . this approach fails to account for the fact that people do seem to us e negative introspection as a source of evi de n ce .
Consequently.
it cannot be used to encode human expert judgment.
(As far as I k now there is no reason to believe that negative int r os pect i on is inheren t l y incoherent.) Also, To i l lust r ate , consider the default rule a:b:--b, which st ate s that if propo siti o n a is believed and it is c ons i stent to believe b, then infer b.
The aut oepi stemic logic equivalent of this rule is La A �L�b --> b.
Presumably, when a k now l edge engineer add s a default rule like this to a k now l edg e base she believes that for the inference domain to which it will be applied the default rule will usually g enerate a valid conclusion.
As a re s ult whether or global reliability) are desirable. 
